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In 2007, Tilmann Köppe sparked a controversy in the Zeitschrift für Germanistik by publish-
ing an article in that journal on what he considere an extremely fashionable interest in recent 
academic literary criticism, namely, numerous attempts at launching a defence of poetry – 
and, by the same token, a defence of literary scholarship as well – by claiming a special 
knowledge for literary texts (Tilmann Köppe, Vom Wissen in Literatur, Zeitschrift für Ger-
manistik N.F. 17 (2007), 398-410). Michael Wood’s Literature and the Taste of Knowledge 
(2005) shares this interest in that it seeks an answer to the question of »why we should bother 
with a novel or a poem when there are other things to do« (175) by discussing what he calls 
»the double subject of this book: the act of representing knowledge, especially elusive knowl-
edge, in words; and the nature of the knowledge that literary arrangements of words can offer 
us.« (2) The bone of contention in Köppe’s article, however, was not so much his diagnosis of 
a development in recent criticism as his claims that so long as literature is fictional it is highly 
problematic to regard it as a source of knowledge in any strict sense of the term (Köppe 2007, 
402 and 408) and that, therefore, it is pointless to defend literature by emphasising its relation 
to knowledge (Köppe 2007, 409). While Michael Wood’s argument goes in the same direc-
tion as the first of these two claims, a full appreciation of Wood’s book must, I think, lead one 
to the conclusion that Köppe is right with the second claim, as well. 
Literature and the Taste of Knowledge combines literary theory with close readings of texts 
by Henry James, Franz Kafka, William Empson, Elizabeth Bishop and with comments on de-
tails of a great number of other literary works, most f them modernist or at least modern. Its 
six chapters are derived from the William Empson Lectures Wood gave in Cambridge in 
2003, and the amiable conversational style in which the book is written seems to owe a great 
deal to that origin. On the whole, the close readings make for a stimulating and highly enter-
taining read, which in itself would be reason enough to recommend the book. However, it is 
as a whole that the book ought to be judged, and on that point, it must be said that the whole 
is not greater than the sum of its various parts, brilliant as most of them undoubtedly are. In 
short, the book scores as a series of findings about literature and certain literary texts but it 
fails to provide a convincing argument as a satisfactory answer to the interesting questions it 
puts up in its introduction, that is, questions about literature and the taste of knowledge. This 
has to do with Wood’s somewhat willful use of the term »knowledge« (cf. 8-9, 15, 29, 51-52, 
54-55, 109-115, 136, 147), of which, however, he is more than aware (cf. 8-9, 109-115). But 
more importantly, Wood focusses too much on what must be considered common-place 
knowledge in academic criticism and, in doing so, overlooks the potential of his subject that 
the title of his book so promisingly suggests. 
 
 
1. A taste of form and fiction 
 
Unlike Tilmann Köppe, Michael Wood is not interested in commenting on recent develop-
ments in literary criticism. For him, the »worry about the relation between literature and 
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knowledge is a very old one« (2) that is of interest when it comes to refuting the »many who 
deny the relevance or importance of literature, who believe that its knowledge, if it has any, is 
trivial or merely decorative.« (11) To explain what literature is and why it matters Wood, 
quite traditionally, opposes literature to science and to the everyday knowledge of its readers 
and comes to the conclusion »that literature characte istically offers something harder – in the 
sense of ›hard sciences‹ – than understanding and something softer than we often imagine 
knowledge to be.« (54) For this in-between that he finds so characteristic of literature, Wood 
employs a metaphor he derives from Salman Rushdie: »There is something unavoidably 
oblique about literature.« (9) Since literature exists »at a slight angle to reality«, as Wood 
quotes Rushdie (ibid.), it is not what we would consider a reliable source of straight knowl-
edge, as Wood makes clear in a rhetorical question near the end of the book: »[…] why would 
we go to a novel for this kind of information, when there are so many other, better places to 
go? The answer […] is we don’t – go to the novel for this kind of information.« (176) 
While Wood concedes that, due to its obliquity, literature loses as an authority on »that kind 
of information« his main concern is what, by the same token, it gains elsewhere. There, three 
aspects come into play that he calls »fiction«, »the taste of knowledge« and »form«. Fiction is 
what Wood’s book is mainly about and the fact that he explicitly admits this only on the last 
page must be taken as an instance of clarity sacrificed for a pseudo-theatrical effect. At the 
book’s finale, he declares with a flourish: »And at this point I think I can bring together the 
two terms I have so carefully been keeping apart: literature and fiction.« (190) The way he 
brings them together is by means of a final definitio : »[…] literature is fiction in the fullest, 
most powerful sense when it sets out to encounter real knowledge along imaginary roads.« 
(ibid.) He reveals his concept of fiction in the second chapter of the book taking his cues from 
Aristotle, Sidney, Wittgenstein, Austin and Roland Barthes: 
[…] I do want us to think about whatever is evoked by poetry in the old sense and by literature in its 
modern sense. That is: representations or imitations of life as it might be and perhaps is; imaginary peo-
ple doing real things; real people doing imaginary things; more rarely, imaginary people doing imagi-
nary things; and more rarely still […] real people doing real things, but not the things they actually did. 
The term »fiction« has come to cover much of the same ground […]. (44) 
In other words, »fiction« here means the licence to speak about real or imaginary people and 
things alike without being liable to being accused of lying (cf. 44-45). To avoid the ambiva-
lence of the term »fiction«, it would have been more p ecise to speak of fictionality here since 
what is meant is that literature is fictional in that it can, but does not have to, speak of imagi-
nary, that is, fictitious persons, things, places, vents. Literature is oblique in that what it 
speaks of does not have to correspond to reality. 
The »criss-crossing dilemma which is at the heart of this book« (45) is that, although fictional 
texts make no claims about the truth of their propositions, there must be some basis to take 
seriously what is said in them because otherwise poetry would not matter at all: »Propositions 
in poems may in the end be more speculative than they look but they may also represent un-
equivocal advice, urgently given and perhaps urgently needed. […] There is no safe place 
here: no literalist’s haven where fact is always fact; nd no paradise of metaphor, where fic-
tion has no truck at all with the harsh and shifting world.« (61) 
Wood spends too much time discussing »the worry about lying« in literature (51) since, on 
closer analysis, his ideas of why literature matters do not at all depend on the truth-value of 
propositions in literature. Literary texts can well »unsettl[e] direct knowledge« (7), »impl[y] 
and project[…] the possible other case« (67) or »know about a particular horror well before it 
happens« (70) without containing a single propositin hat cannot be proved wrong. First of 
all, readers familiar with the concept of fictionality should be prepared to believe even the un-
believable when it comes to reading literature, as Wood is well aware: »We can scarcely tell 
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the poet from the magician. He wants us to believe and not believe, and the extraordinary 
thing is how good we are at performing this double act, virtually without thinking, and with-
out the least strain.« (59) Secondly, Aristotle’s definition of »poetry« as being »a more phi-
losophical and higher thing than history« and his distinction between the »universal« and the 
»particular« contents of a text (cf. 48) allows an explanation of how fictional texts can pro-
vide knowledge of the world and the way it is governed by »probability and necessity« even if 
the persons, places and events they speak of are completely fictitious. It allows an explanation 
of how, in other words, fictional texts can make false propositions concerning the particulars 
and still be regarded as expressing universal truths. Although Wood does quote the very pas-
sage he completely misses its relevance for his problem by restricting his attention to the par-
ticular contents of fictional texts (cf. 48-49). 
Thirdly and most importantly, literary texts can matter to readers who do not share the univer-
sal claims made in them, as Wood later in the book points out: »But unlike a human arguer, 
the poem doesn’t need to be right, and what it knows is different from what it says. It knows 
there is a good chance that many people will think its affirmation is right, and that even those 
who disagree with it will think the argument matters.« (101-102) 
The question would now be how literary texts do not depend on their being accepted as speak-
ing the truth, in particular or universally, for their being relevant to their readers. What 
Wood’s lengthy argument about aspects of fictionality amounts to is the thought that »what 
we believe a novel shows us is always going to be more than the facts as we may get them 
from another source« (177). That leaves the question what this »more« is, and at this point, 
the aspects of »form« and »the taste of knowledge« come in. 
Wood rightly emphasises the contribution of formal aspects to what he calls »the literary«: 
»The literary is everywhere, but literature is a formalized concentration of the literary, and the 
degree of formalization is significant.« (111) When he devotes his fifth chapter to the ques-
tion »what literary forms know of« (136, cf. 147) the limits of his concept of form undermine 
his argument. By »form« Wood means only the exterior aspects of form, that is strophic pat-
terns, meter, rhyme and the playing with sounds in ge eral. But what is supposed to be a 
»playing form against meaning«, in his brilliant analysis of two poems by William Empson 
and Elizabeth Bishop, respectively, is in fact a demonstration that any meaning not carried by 
explicit proposition is the result of form on the smantic level. A case in point is the »elegant 
false parallelism« Wood identifies in Bishop’s poem (cf. 156). There is no reason, of course, 
why one could not define form in a way that excludes the semantic level as Wood does. Here, 
however, the definition of the term »form« is one of the reasons why Wood fails to satisfacto-
rily describe the specifically literary way to deal with knowledge. 
 
2. Taste not tasted 
 
If considering the aspect of fictionality merely reveals that it is not as a source of direct 
knowledge that literature matters and if Wood’s definition of form fails as a tool to describing 
what the specifically literary is that literature can offer, the third of the three key concepts still
looks promising. The more so since the title of Wood’s book suggests that it has something to 
tell about how literature’s domain is to provide not plain knowledge but knowledge with a 
taste – the taste being the main thing. Unfortunately, he book has not much to say about this, 
and for that Wood’s discussion of Roland Barthes’s Leçon, from where he takes the metaphor 
of the taste of knowledge, is mainly to blame. 
Wood introduces Barthes and the metaphor in the introduction, quoting from the Leçon: 
»›[…] It is the taste of words which makes knowledg profound, fecund.‹ The knowledge 
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Barthes has in mind is distinctly the knowledge found in literature, and I shall return to his 
intricate thoughts on this topic.« (10) He returns to Barthes many times throughout the book 
but never in connection with the metaphor of taste nd the notion that the taste of words can 
make knowledge profound, fecund. Instead, he takes up his discussion of the Leçon in the 
second chapter quoting Barthes on the distance between hat Barthes calls »la science« and 
»la vie« and on his claim that »c’est pour corriger c tte distance que la littérature nous im-
porte« (cf. 38-40). Wood then takes up »[t]he idea of correction« as »our main focus here« 
coming to the question what literature is if it is »neither knowledge nor life« (40). That leads 
him to the question of suspended knowledge, i.e. of ostensible lies and truths in literary texts 
(40-44). Wood comes to the conclusion that literature is »[…] a space where [b]oth knowl-
edge and life get a day off« (41) and, thus, arrives at the above-mentioned lengthy discussion 
of fictionality (44-46). 
One wonders whether Wood’s reading of the Leçon does not miss its Nietzscheanian point. 
When Barthes regards the relation between »la science« and »la vie« as the opposition of 
»grossièreté« and »subtilité«, what he means is that »la science« produces knowledge by 
naming and defining everything in the universe. Thus, Barthes considers »la science« as an 
instance of »le pouvoir qui est dans la langue« (Roland Barthes, Leçon, Paris 1978, 12). By 
labelling things, people, animals, events, however, »la science« must necessarily generalize 
and, in doing so, neglect certain differences betwen things, individual people, animals, 
events and reducing them to certain characteristics that make them items of certain categories: 
»le signe est suiviste, grégaire ; en chaque signe dort ce monstre : un stéréotype« (Barthes 
1978, 15). »La science« is coarse, in that it suppresses individuality since the subtle differ-
ences that make real-»life« experience so »profound« a  »fecund« elude it. Moreover, since 
»la langue est immédiatement assertive« (Barthes 1978, 14), the scientific production of 
knowledge through language fixes individuals as memb rs of certain categories and thereby 
suppresses the sensitivity for both the variety and the ever-flowing change in life. It is easy to 
trace Barthes’s views on language back to Nietzsche’  influential vitalistic criticism of mod-
ern language as a ramshackle construction made of dad technical terms (cf. Über Wahrheit 
und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinne). 
Given that, Barthes’s notion of how literature can possibly correct the distance between sci-
ence and life does not so much point towards the asp ct of fictionality but rather towards 
something that can be referred to as the sensuousness of literary texts. Literature viewed 
within the context of Barthes’s opposition of »la science« and »la vie« is a way of language 
not being coarse. Since there is no way around language when one wants to speak of anything 
the question arises if there aren’t ways to speak about things without subjugating life to sci-
ence, individuality to uniforming labels, the senses to the brain. Literature, Barthes suggests, 
offers such ways precisely because the knowledge it offers is not fixed and final and because 
it is the taste of the knowledge it offers that counts more than the knowledge itself. Literature 
is supposed to deal with knowledge »selon un discour  q i n’est plus épistémologique, mais 
dramatique« (Barthes 1978, 19), it »met en scène le langage, au lieu, simplement, de 
l’utiliser« (ibid.); 
[E]lle reconnaît que le langage est un immense halod’implications, d’effets, de retentissements, de 
tours, de retours, de redans; elle assume de faire entendre un sujet à la fois insistant et irréparable, in-
connu et cependant reconnu selon une inquiétante familiarité : les mots ne sont plus conçus illusoire-
ment comme de simples instruments, ils sont lancés comme des projections, des explosions, des vibra-
tions, des machineries, des saveurs […]. (Barthes 1978, 20)  
To run his message home on a performative level as well, Barthes chooses his words here to 
be rather more pregnant (shall we say: »fecund«?) than precise but it is unquestionable what 
he means by that »la littérature fait du savoir unefêt « (Barthes 1978, 20; quoted in Wood 
2005, 40): it breathes, as it were, life in the dead words that constitute language in that they 
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are made to convey not the fixed uniformity of scientific concepts but the ever-changing and 
ever-moving variety of life in all its forms and expressions, not just meanings as ideas but 
also emotions, moods and sensuous experiences. And in that sense, too, Barthes suggests that 
literature, or, as he also calls it: »l’écriture« (cf. Barthes 1978, 17), »se retrouve partout où les 
mots ont de la saveur« (Barthes 1978, 21). When Barthes claims that »la littérature fait du sa-
voir une fête« he means that what otherwise would be ead knowledge tastes of life when it is 
presented in literature: »C’est ce goût des mots qui fait le savoir profond, fécond.« (ibid.) 
Barthes’s use of »fête«, thus clearly points to the sensuous side of literature to which he else-
where refers as »le plaisir du texte«. This may involve what Wood understands by »form«, 
that is a playing with sounds and rhythms, as is often the case in poetry. But Barthes’s claim 
that literature does not, as science does, offer knowledge as »énoncés« but as »énonciations« 
suggests that the pleasure of the literary text depends on something other than the merely ex-
terior aspects of form. For Barthes, the difference between the two forms of utterance is that 
the »énoncé« seeks to convey pure, precise objective knowledge, whereas the »énonciation« 
both brings in the subjectivity of the speaker and stages language, to use Barthes’s words, as a 
place for ambiguity and vivid variety (cf. Barthes 1978, 20). What exactly that means in terms 
of literary techniques, Barthes does not say, but one wonders whether Wood could not have 
filled the gap by focussing on certain techniques of representation that particularly appeal to 
the reader’s imagination, thereby simulating real-life experience of human beings, places and 
events. Wood seems to do just that when he brings in Barthes’s metaphor of the taste of words 
to illustrate that reading can be »an immediate event« and literature – in the words Wood 
quotes in his introduction from Dorothy Walsh – »a form of lived experience« (9). Unfortu-
nately, after this, Wood ignores the pleasure aspect altogether by both dropping the taste 
metaphor and translating Barthes’s use of »fête« as »holiday« in the sense of »a day off«, 
which, as we have seen, leads him to the question of ficti nality when he could have gained 
so much more by discussing literature as a form of representation. 
For someone exploring the taste of knowledge provided by literary texts, he shows remarka-
bly little interest in how literature actually renders the imaginary world tasteable, how it can 
make readers see, hear, feel, smell and even taste people, things, places and events in their 
imagination. A case in point is Wood’s discussion of Kate Croy in James’s Wings of the dove. 
His argument hinges on the claim that although readers may most likely »regard her attitude 
as wrong« (29), to simply condemn her for this would be »to have missed ev-erything that 
matters about Kate, and to have misrepresented our own feelings about her and her actions.« 
(33). Wood argues that there are things to »admire« (32-33: »her clarity and her courage«, 
»her straightness«) and even to like about her (19: where he calls Kate and Densher »these 
likeable people«). This tension between an unequivocal moral judgment of a character’s atti-
tude and actions and the feelings the same character evokes in the reader would indeed be 
enough to justify Wood’s claim that James’s novel »rattles not our morals but our sense of 
their reasonableness, and that is why we are in such a fix when we try to talk about the book.« 
(34) 
However, instead of pursuing this lead and considering his notion of a conflict of feelings and 
attitudes towards the character as an achievement of literary form on the semantic level, 
Wood seeks to solve the conflict by discussing whether, once one starts thinking about it, 
Kate’s actions do not fail so utterly and, therefor, »Kate’s scheme is unconventional and in-
direct, but can’t be substantively wrong.« (33) He is right in pointing out that the novel keeps 
this question open (34) but he does not show how it does so, since he discusses this question 
solely on a rational level. And one may well wonder why a reader should take the trouble 
working himself through hundreds of pages of James’s difficult poetic prose when he can 
have »the question of knowledge in The Wings of the Dove« (31), »the question of Kate’s 
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wrongdoing« (ibid.) and the »exquisite moral dilemma« that »James has crafted […] for us as 
well as for his characters« (32) outlined and discus ed on no more than 25 pages of Wood’s 
extremely well written and lucidly argued analysis of the novel.  
There is more to James’s novel, of course, than merely recognising the questions and moral 
dilemmas. This can equally well be done by reading Wood’s analysis – or even better so, 
since he takes much less space and a far simpler language and is also much clearer. The diffi-
culties and the length of James’s novel provide what an analysis of a novel cannot offer, that 
is, an opportunity for the reader to feel the impact of the questions and the moral dilemmas by 
reliving and re-experiencing what the novel present as the lives and the experiences of its 
characters. To that crucial aspect, however, Wood pays almost no attention whatsoever. He 
thereby misses the opportunity to show how James’s t xt undermines or, as Wood calls it, 
»rattles« our moral judgment by letting us share the fascination the other characters in the 
novel feel for Kate. To do that, one would have to consider the way Kate is represented by 
means of description and imagery, how her looks, her humour, her plight, her courage, her 
intelligence are presented to the imagination of the reader so that readers do not just get an 
idea of her but a taste as well. It is significant that Wood reduces the relationship between 
Milly and Kate to a rational aspect: »it is because th y both try to name things and to know 
things that they hit it off so well.« (32) This, however, ignores the fact that James’s text goes 
to great lengths to convey both the shear physical attraction Kate has for Milly and Milly’s 
fascination for everything in Kate that she herself thinks she is not or has not, but would des-
perately like to be and like to have. This also accounts for Milly’s not liking Kate any less for 
her being »the least bit brutal« (ibid.). What Wood misses in paying almost no attention to the 
sensuous aspect of the novel is that it may not only be »the reasonableness« of »our moral 
sense« that the novel »rattles« but its emotional basis too. 
 
3. A taste of more 
 
What is sorely missing from Wood’s book is anything equivalent to Gottfried Willems’s con-
cept of literature as an »evaluative communication on values« (Gottfried Willems, Literatur, 
in: Ulfert Ricklefs (Ed.), Fischer Lexikon Literatur, Frankfurt a.M. 1996, 1012: »wertende 
Verständigung über Werte«). By that, Willems means that literature does not just speak of 
human beings, human actions, places and events but that it presents them in the light of hu-
man values – the values of literary characters as well as narrators, implied authors, etc. Thus, 
the knowledge that can be drawn from literary texts is both a knowledge about the values of 
certain people and/or literary characters and a knowledge about the relation of knowledge to 
values. According to this concept, the recipients of literary texts – the reader or the audience 
in the theatre – are engaged in this kind of evaluative communication in a way that provokes 
an evaluative reaction from them. Of course, this comprises an evaluation of literary quality 
of a text but what is meant by an »evaluative communication on values« goes beyond that. 
Recipients of poems, novels and plays are not just to learn about values expressed openly or 
covertly in a fictional context but they are to feel the urge to wonder whether they themselves 
share those values or some of them or none of them at all.  
This then involves the recipients’ emotional side, their sympathising with the characters, their 
endorsing or abhorring their actions. Recipients are to find people, places, things and events 
likeable or disgusting, fascinating or boring, portentous or negligible. This appeal to the emo-
tionally evaluative side, Willems argues, results from the main feature of literary texts, i.e. 
their sensuousness (Willems 1996, 1017: »Anschaulichkeit«; cf. Gottfried Willems, Anschau-
lichkeit, Tübingen 1989.), achieved by description and imagery. Literary texts, thus, do not 
just appeal to the intellect but above all to the imagination so that readers of a novel or a poem 
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are made to believe they can actually see, hear, feel, smell and taste the things of which the 
literary text speaks. And so readers can, as if from experience, find their own views and val-
ues supported or questioned. They may even find, as it were, intuitive access to views and 
values they would never dream of sharing. Unlike th knowledge literature may or may not 
have to offer, the views and values it expresses can be of personal relevance, not just histori-
cal interest, even to those who do not share them. And it is this feature which accounts for 
Wood’s observations that »we – don’t go to a novel for this kind of information« (176), that 
»what we believe a novel shows us is always going to be more than the facts as we may get 
them from another source« (177) and that »unlike a human arguer, the poem doesn’t need to 
be right« (101).  
It is by no means that Wood fails to see the significance of the evaluative and the sensuous 
aspects of literature, as becomes clear from his rema k on a sonnet by Rilke: »It speaks not of 
life and change in general but of the specific lived life and probably failed change of each of 
us.« (102) The same kind of insight is apparent in what Wood says about literature’s »always 
work[ing] as a parable« (127): »We can’t make sense of [parables] if we don’t find this scene, 
if we don’t apply them somewhere, if we don’t find a connection for them in the world we 
inhabit.« (126-127) Finally, the subjective aspect r appears in Wood’s concluding sentence of 
the last chapter: »Somewhere between what Nietzsche calls the horizon of our knowledge 
[i.e.: ›I do suffer.‹, cf. 185] and what he calls truths is the whole realm of what writers and 
readers and texts make of the fictionable world.« (187) What Wood’s book lacks, however – 
in order to explain these observations and satisfacorily describe what makes literature matter 
– is terminological consistence and a systematic approach to its questions. 
At one point, Wood asks what knowledge is to be had from criticism and interpretation in the 
humanities (53-54). The title of his book promises an answer to this nagging question: aca-
demic literary criticism offers knowledge about how differently knowledge can taste when it 
is communicated in literature. Even more precisely, it could be said using Willems’s terms: 
academic literary criticism offers knowledge of the uge varieties of world views and values 
that are expressed in literature and about the various possibilities to express world views and 
values in language. Of that knowledge, on which one could and perhaps should base any de-
fence of an endangered academic discipline, Michael Wood’s book offers but a taste. 
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